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On October 16, 1998, General Augusto Pinochet was arrested in
London, England on charges contained in a Spanish provisional arrest
warrant alleging that he was responsible for the murder of Spanish citizens
in Chile while he was the ruler of that country. 171 A second provisional
warrant was issued on October 22, 1998172 and both were quashed by the
Queen's Bench Divisional Court on October 28, 1998.17' Next, on
November 25, 1998, an appellate committee from the House of Lords
issued an opinion reversing the lower court's decision, finding that
General Pinochet could not benefit from head-of-state immunity and could
potentially be extradited for crimes against international law. 174 This
opinion was set aside on the ground that there was bias found on the
committee. The issue was presented to a second panel in the House of
Lords, which ruled with one dissenter on March 24, 1999 that General
Pinochet's extradition could proceed. 175 Based on this opinion and
supplemental charges from the Spanish government, 176 Magistrate Ronald
Bartle decided on October 8, 1999 that the requirements had been met to
"commit Senator Pinochet to await the decision of the Secretary of State"
on whether to extradite him to Spain. 177 Ultimately, the decision whether
to extradite General Pinochet rests in the hands of the United Kingdom
Home Secretary Jack Straw, who can take into consideration the courts'
rulings. 17
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The ruling of the House of Lords that General Pinochet can be
extradited to Spain to stand trial for crimes against humanity lends support
to the emerging theory of universal jurisdiction for certain crimes under
international law. 179 The following discussion of the elements of General
Pinochet's case will show that the international community, by and large,
is willing to sacrifice some national sovereignty in order to eradicate
torture and other human rights violations. It will do so through an
elucidation of the concepts of jus cogens, international ethics, head of
state immunity, human rights crimes, universal jurisdiction, and
extradition.
I. JUS COGENS
The system of international law is a tangled mass of bilateral and
multilateral agreements between States that has grown steadily over the
years. 180However, the notion of jus cogens, fundamental social and legal
norms, is superior to all treaties and any other customary law.181 The
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties definesjus cogens as "a norm
accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a
whole, a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be
modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having
the same character." 1
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Because the international system of laws is not centralized and relies
mainly upon the independent will of various states, 183 it is critical to have
certain norms that every country agrees are important and should have
precedential status over all other laws. Legal norms that have reached the
status of jus cogens are inextricably linked to the concept of obligations
erga omnes, or obligations that a State owes toward the entire
international community rather than toward just one or a few other
States.' 84 In the Barcelona Traction Case, the International Court of
Justice referred to such obligations in dicta, stating that they derive from
outlawing "acts of aggression, and of genocide, as also from the principles
and rules concerning the basic rights of the human person."' 85 In general,
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for a norm to reachjus cogens status and in turn generate obligations erga
omnes, the norm must be developed through the international system for
many years until it is recognized throughout the world.
The prohibition against torture began to gain status as an international
legal norm after World War II, following discovery of the inhumane
treatment of people in prisons and concentration camps. 186 The prohibition
was officially referred to as early as 1948 in the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights wherein Article 5 reads: "No one shall be subjected to
torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment."
187
This same prohibition was also included in the European Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 1950, with
the exception of the term "cruel" which was considered too subjective. 188
In 1973 and 1974, the U.N. General Assembly passed Resolutions 3059,
3452 and 3453, essentially declaring torture on a large scale to be a crime
against humanity. 189 Today "it is the generally accepted view among
international lawyers that the prohibition of torture has developed into a
rule of customary international law applying equally to States" (emphasis
in original). 190
The concept of jus cogens is very important in the case of General
Pinochet, because if the prohibition of torture has indeed reached the
status of an international peremptory norm, as the authorities tend to
agree, 191 then it would logically follow that torture is an international
crime for which anyone can be punished anywhere in the world. This
principle is well-illustrated in a recent case decided in the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Ohio where the court reasoned
that offenders ofjus cogens are in effect "common enemies of all mankind
and all nations have an equal interest in their apprehension and
prosecution,"'192 To better understand the role of peremptory norms in
international law, it is necessary to explore the basic concepts of
international ethics and how they relate to human rights.
II. INTERNATIONAL ETHICS
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A large part of international ethics is determining who has the
authority or power to enforce international laws. This question is
answered very differently by the two main competing theories of law,
"naturalism" and "positivism."'193 Naturalism assumes that the rules of
human behavior arise from sources beyond the will of man. The theory of
naturalism posits that the rules that we instinctively follow come from
physical nature, ethics or morality, and the concept of "divine law."'
194
Cicero was the father of a theory called "true law" which is the natural law
based on human ethics that results in "eternal, universal and constant rules
of law" that govern human behavior. 195 A common morality, felt within all
human beings, is what makes people value basic human rights such as
justice, respect for human life, and the ability to live life with honor and
dignity.
196
The theory of positivism dominates modern political thinking. 197 It
emphasizes human discretion as the authority for law and is distrustful of
any moral balancing that might factor into lawmaking. 198 Positivism is
directly opposed to the universal conceptions of morality espoused by
naturalism and upon which international law depends, because no state
has the power to enforce a universal law on any other state. 199 If there is to
be enforcement of international crimes like those committed by Pinochet,
there must be a recognized source of authority that supersedes the
sovereign state.
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In the realm of international law, the theories of naturalism and
positivism are given meaning by the legal concepts of monism and
dualism. The dualistic system, which prevails in modern thinking,
distinguishes between international legal rules and the law of sovereign
states.20 1 If criminals like Pinochet are to be punished, dualism must give
way to some extent to the monistic system. The system of monism
advanced by John Jay, the first Chief Justice of the United States, consists
of treaties that govern sovereign states as well as the international
community. It propounds that state constitutions can be amended by treaty
and that a single legal order, based upon reason, reigns over the entire
international system.20 2 While monism would be more compatible with
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international law, it would be unrealistic in a world built upon national
sovereignty.
To complicate matters further, the conflicting legal approaches of
dualism and monism combine with varying philosophical perspectives to
create several theories of international ethics. 2 0 3 "Supernatural" ethics rely
on either divine law or universal reason and find that any law made which
violates these principles is void and is therefore not binding. "Intuitionist"
ethics rely on an individual's objective and intuitive feeling of the
rightness or wrongness of certain conduct to determine which laws are
binding. "Pragmatic" ethics focus on the feasibility of punishing criminals
for their moral violations. "Noncognitivist" ethics regard certain moral
dilemmas as beyond the reach of rational discussion because there are so
many individual views.20 4 The supernatural scheme is most compatible
with the naturalistic and monistic schools of thought.
Deaths related to mass murder, torture and "disappearance" carried out
over a number of years by totalitarian and authoritarian regimes, like those
for which Pinochet is responsible, have claimed the lives of 169 million
persons worldwide this century. 20 5 This rate is "nearly four and a half
times the rate of wartime deaths."20 6 One recent example of such a regime
is the internal struggle in the African nation of Rwanda and the resulting
genocide. 20 7 An international tribunal has been set up to try and punish
those involved for their crimes against human rights, but the authority to
enforce the punishments is still tenuous; ". . . their authority is based
exclusively on positive submission" of the parties to the dispute, and if
either party is unhappy with the result, it does not have to obey the
tribunal's ruling. 20 8 Although work on the International Criminal Court is
ongoing and human rights supporters are hopeful that it will be effective
in carrying out punishments,20 9 as long as the protection of human rights is
regarded by states as a noncompulsory alternative rather than as an
obligation, punishments will not be regularly enforced.210
Human rights are based on universally accepted ethical norms and
were first "expressed fundamentally as claims of individuals against the
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state.",2 11 The moral theory of human rights claims that individuals are
entitled to certain fundamental rights that are grounded in morality, simply
by virtue of their humanity.2 12 Although these rights were originally
thought to exist independently of the society and the State in which people
lived, Edmund Burke challenged this thought with his theory that human
rights were benefits that people received in return for participation in their
political community. 2 13 The moral theory has been rejected by modern
scholars, due at least in part to the lack of authority to enforce the rules.
214
In addition, "[b]ecause of the widespread relativity of values found in the
world, some thinkers have concluded that there can be no international
morality. "
215
Cultural relativism seriously affects human rights and the ethics debate
because different cultures value different morals, making it difficult, if not
impossible, to enforce a universal concept of human rights. In order to
prosecute crimes against humanity, like those committed by Pinochet, on a
worldwide scale, the concept of human rights must fall somewhere in
between total universalism and cultural relativism.216 Such a balance must
be struck to protect human rights "without unduly threatening the
decentralized nature of global society."
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In almost every culture, torture, in varying degrees, is considered a
crime against humanity as well as a violation of human morality. General
Pinochet's crimes can hardly be recognized as anything less than torture,
and, therefore, international ethical principles demand that he be punished
for the crimes of his regime. However, in the Pinochet case, another
powerful international norm exists that is directly opposed to General
Pinochet's potential extradition and punishment for the crime of torture:
the concept of sovereign immunity for former heads of state.
III. HEAD OF STATE IMMUNITY
The doctrine of sovereign immunity has arisen mainly through judicial
decisions in national courts since the nineteenth century. 218 The American
Supreme Court was the first to recognize this doctrine in the case of The
Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon and Others, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116
(1812), where Chief Justice Marshall clearly set out the supreme
211 [d. at 71.212 Id. at 72-73.
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218 See Gamal Moursi Badr, State Immunity An Analytical and Prognostic View 9
(1984).
importance of national sovereignty in international law.219 The United
States codified its interpretation of foreign state immunity in the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976. The British treaty governing state
immunity is the State Immunity Act of 1978, and it is this Act that
General Pinochet relies upon to exempt him from British jurisdiction.
Generally, Part I of the British Act provides for immunity of foreign states
from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United Kingdom except as
provided by the Act.220 However, Section 16(4) provides that Part I does
not apply to criminal proceedings, thus making that part inapplicable to
Pinochet.
221
At this point, a clarification must be made between immunity ratione
personae and immunity ratione materiae. In the Pinochet case Lord Millet
makes the distinction that immunity ratione personae protects an
individual who holds a particular office, such as a head of state or a
diplomat. 222 Immunity ratione materiae, on the other hand, "operates to
prevent the official and governmental acts of one state from being called
into question in proceedings before the courts of another and only
incidentally confers immunity on the individual. 2 23 Since General
Pinochet no longer holds the office of head of state in Chile, he is not
entitled to immunity ratione personae. Only immunity ratione materiae,
Pinochet's immunity for acts committed while he was in office, is at issue
in this case.
Part III, Section 20(a)(1) of the British State Immunity Act gives
statutory force to the doctrine of immunity ratione materiae, and it is the
section upon which General Pinochet relies as giving him immunity from
prosecution for acts of torture.224 This section incorporates the Diplomatic
Privileges Act of 1964 and, subject to the provisions of the section and to
''any necessary modifications," applies the same immunity to heads of
state as is applied to "the head of a diplomatic mission." 225 The
Diplomatic Privileges Act is the codification into British law of the
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961 .226 Article 39 of the
Vienna Convention is difficult to apply to the present situation with
General Pinochet as a former head of state. The language in Article 39
refers to the diplomat's "appointment" and "functions as a member of the
mission,"2 27 which can be stretched to cover a head of state, as in Section
20(a)(1), but clearly does not make sense as applying to a former head of
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223 [d.
224 See id. at *598.
225 Badr, supra note 48, at 201.
226 Bartle, 38 I.L.M. at *598.
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state who is merely visiting the United Kingdom. Basically, state
immunity and diplomatic immunity are seen as completely separate from
one another in international law, with each doctrine having its own set of
rules and restrictions.
228
Lord Goff of Chieveley, the lone dissenter in the House of Lords
decision delivered on March 24, 1999, was largely concerned with the fact
that the majority interpreted Chile's signing of the Convention Against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
(hereinafter "Torture Convention") as an implied waiver of immunity.229
Lord Goff contends that a state's waiver of immunity must be expressly
stated in a treaty. 23 Since Chile did not expressly waive immunity when
signing the Torture Convention, Lord Goff believes Chile did not waive
its immunity by signing it.231 Lord Goff also relied heavily on a United
States Supreme Court decision which ruled that signing a treaty is not
enough to waive immunity and that a waiver must be express. 232 The
majority of the Lords did not accept Lord Goffs argument that Chile did
not waive its immunity by signing the Convention 33 and the distinction
between public and private acts is useful to point out the fatal flaw in his
reasoning.
Because state immunity extends to actual persons who represent the
state in an official capacity, it is necessary to distinguish between those
persons' public and private acts. The widely used factual test for
determining whether a state official has acted publicly or privately is
"whether private individuals can also perform an act similar to the foreign
state's disputed act. '234 The acts committed by Pinochet, it is argued, were
done under state authority and in the furtherance of governmental
objectives and accordingly were functions of the head of state.235
However, Lord Hutton argues quite simply that General Pinochet is not
entitled to immunity because acts of torture cannot possibly be construed
as functions of the head of state. 236 Also, by the factual test set out above,
Pinochet's acts of ordering torture and conspiring to perform torture are
private acts, because they could also have been committed by a private
individual. Lord Hope of Craighead points out that if these acts are acts of
state, as Pinochet argues, then regardless of whether they are criminal or
228 See Charter of the International Military Tribunal of Nuremberg, adopted 1945, art.7,
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not, no further analysis is necessary. 237 Lord Hope relies on the fact that
these acts have acquired the status ofjus cogens, and thus all states are
compelled not to engage in such conduct. 238 In this situation, the
prohibition on torture, accepted worldwide, overrides the immunity that a
former head of state may assert for acts committed while in office. The
fundamental legal norm against the commission of human rights
violations trumps sovereign immunity.
IV. HUMAN RIGHTS CRIMES
General Pinochet faces over thirty different charges, according to the
Spanish extradition request.239 These charges range from conspiracy to
torture and conspiracy to take hostages, to torture and attempted
murder. 240  Although, Pinochet's secret police force, Direction de
Inteligencia Nacional (DINA), is thought to have carried out most of the
actual torture,241 Lord Hope of Craighead puts forth in his opinion that
Pinochet was at the center of a continuing "conspiracy to commit
widespread and systematic torture and murder in order to ...maintain
control of government."242 The torture carried out by the DINA, allegedly
ordered by General Pinochet, included "the grill," a method involving
administering electric shocks to sensitive body parts, and the "dry
submarine," a method of suffocation by placing a bag on the victim's
head.243 The United Nations deplored this type of regime in government
and in 1977 began drafting the Torture Convention, which came into
effect in 1984.
Although this is a fairly new agreement, it is important to remember
that torture was already considered an international crime when the
Torture Convention was adopted by the United Nations.244 The purpose of
the Torture Convention is "to make more effective the struggle against
torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment
throughout the world 2 45 by adopting a system under which the alleged
torturer cannot escape punishment simply by fleeing his country.246 The
Torture Convention is specific in the type of torture it seeks to prosecute
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and the statutory definition found in Part I, Article I of the Torture
Convention is important to analyzing the case of General Pinochet. The
Torture Convention outlaws as torture "any act by which severe pain or
suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person
• . . by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a
public official or other person acting in an official capacity." 247 The
Torture Convention outlaws "official" torture, that torture engaged in by
the government against citizens, identical to the alleged crimes of General
Pinochet. The Torture Convention is also clear in its position on possible
governmental justification for torture, stating that "no exceptional
circumstances whatsoever . . . may be invoked as justification of
torture. ,
248
The Torture Convention was ratified by the United Kingdom on
December 8, 1988 and was adopted into British law by the Criminal
Justice Act of 1988, Section 134.249 Article I, Part I of the Torture
Convention was restated as Section 134(1) of the British Criminal Justice
Act.250 The effect of this section is to make official torture, no matter
where it was committed or the nationality of the offender, an
extraterritorial offense in the United Kingdom. 251 The international crime
of torture became an "extradition crime" under the law of the United
Kingdom as of September 29, 1988,252 when the Criminal Justice Act
came into force. Spain had ratified the Torture Convention on October 27,
1987253 as did Chile on September 30, 1988; at the time the British ratified
the Torture Convention, December 8, 1988, all three countries involved in
General Pinochet's extradition for human rights crimes were parties to the
agreement.
254
The requirements for the exercise of jurisdiction are set out in Part I,
Article 5 of the Torture Convention. Jurisdiction is given first to either (a)
the territory where the offenses were committed, in this case, Chile; (b)
the territory of which the offender is a national, also Chile; or (c) the
territory of which the victim is a national, in this case, Spain. Notably,
although Chile and/or Spain may have primary jurisdiction over General
Pinochet with respect to these crimes, jurisdiction may also be exercised
by the United Kingdom through Section 2 of Article 5 of Britain's
Criminal Justice Act. 255 At this point in the analysis it is clear that the
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head of state immunity asserted as a defense by General Pinochet is
completely illogical. Lord Hope of Craighead agrees that it would be a
"strange result" if the provisions of the Torture Convention could not be
applied to heads of state who, having instigated the carrying out of torture
by their officials, were primarily responsible for the acts of torture.
256
Lord Saville adds that "a head of state ... would indeed to my mind be a
prime example of an official torturer."257 Essentially, when states ratified
the Torture Convention, they agreed to a type of "universal jurisdiction"
for the international crime of torture.
V. UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION
The concept of universal jurisdiction was introduced by international
military tribunals. The first of these tribunals was established at
Nuremberg, Germany in August 1945 by the Allied Powers that had just
defeated Nazi Germany. 258 The purpose of the tribunal was to try war
criminals whose offenses, and thus jurisdiction, could not be linked to any
one country. Not only was this the advent of granting universal
jurisdiction for war crimes, it also marked the official recognition of
individual responsibility for international crime.259 A similar agreement,
the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, was established in
Tokyo for the same purpose and like the Nuremberg Tribunal, derived its
competence to exercise jurisdiction over those crimes from the Charter
which created it.
260
More recent examples of international tribunals that truly apply
international law on an international scale include the International
Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia (1993) and Rwanda
(1994).261 The need for these tribunals arose from internal power struggles
among different ethnic groups in those countries. 262 Even though the
jurisdiction of these tribunals was on a smaller scale than the
aforementioned Military Tribunals, the United Nations Security Council
resolution which created them allowed for the prosecution of "persons
responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law."263
Torture is included as a crime against humanity punishable under the
statutes which created the tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda, "when
committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack against any
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217 Id. at *642.
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259 See id.
260 See Sunga, supra note 10, at 283.261 See id. at 283-84.
262 See id. at 284-89, 290-97.
263 U.N. Secretary General's Report, S/25704, May 3, 1993 & Add. 1, May 17, 1993,
quoted in Sunga, supra note 10, at 289.
civilian population. '" 264 The prohibition against torture as an international
crime also appears in Article 7 of the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court.
265
The International Criminal Court was created by a Rome statute
adopted by the United Nations Diplomatic Conference on July 17,
2661998. Once it has been ratified by 60 states, this Statute will go into
force creating the International Criminal Court in The Hague,
Netherlands. 267 Article 7(1)(f) specifically mentions torture as a crime
against humanity and Article 5(1)(b) expressly gives the Court jurisdiction
over the crime of torture.268 In addition, once a state becomes a party to
this agreement, the Court may exercise its functions and powers over the
territory of that State. By giving the Court this power, a State sacrifices its
national sovereignty in the area of international crime and the Statute
makes clear that no claim of official immunity shall bar the Court from
exercising jurisdiction over a person.26 9 Unfortunately, the Statute does
not apply to crimes committed before its adoption 270 and thus is not an
option for punishing General Pinochet. However, the Torture Convention,
discussed above, provides for universal jurisdiction in national courts
rather than jurisdiction by an international tribunal.27'
Article 5 of the Torture Convention governs jurisdiction. As
previously discussed, primary jurisdiction is given to the state where the
torture was committed, the state of the torturer or the state of the victim.
272
However, secondary jurisdiction is also given to any State Party to the
Convention where the torturer is present and the State does not extradite
him.273 Lord Browne-Wilkinson noted that by drafting the agreement this
way, the Convention introduced the idea of "aut dedere autpunire - either
you extradite or you punish., 274 Throughout the negotiations surrounding
the drafting of the Torture Convention, there were countries who wished
to make the secondary jurisdiction in Article 5(2) dependent upon the
refusal of the state assuming jurisdiction to extradite the offender to a state
with primary jurisdiction under Article 5(1).275 The final result, however,
was noted in Working Group draft documents in 1984, when all state
264 Statutes of the International Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, art. 5
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objections to universal jurisdiction were withdrawn. 276 The drafters of the
Torture Convention agreed that the only way for the Torture Convention
to be used effectively would be to relax national jurisdiction principles to
allow for torture to be punished anywhere the offender tried to hide.
Again, as of December 8, 1988, the United Kingdom, Spain and Chile
were all parties to the Torture Convention, and, thus, General Pinochet
should reasonably expect to lose any immunity he could have claimed for
his crimes as of that date.
277
Proposing an alternative theory for asserting universal jurisdiction in
the case of General Pinochet, Lord Millett suggested two requirements
that might be met.278 First, the crime "must be contrary to a peremptory
norm of international law so as to infringe a jus cogens" and secondly, the
crime "must be so serious and on such a scale that [it] can justly be
regarded as an attack on the international legal order." 279 Either by using
the jurisdiction granted by the Torture Convention to which all three states
are parties, or by using Lord Millett's test for universal jurisdiction, the
crimes of General Pinochet clearly justify his prosecution in any state
where jurisdiction is asserted.
VI. EXTRADITION
Although jurisdiction can be exercised over General Pinochet in either
Spain, Chile or the United Kingdom, Spain has formally indicted the
former general on charges of genocide, terrorism and torture.
280
Extradition in the United Kingdom depends first on a decision from the
Secretary of State that the request should be considered. The offender is
then arrested and brought before the Chief Metropolitan Stipendiary
Magistrate at Bow Street, London who looks at the request and any
attached documentation in support of the request and decides
accordingly. 281 In this particular case, the ruling of the Magistrate was
appealed and proceeded to the Queen's Bench Divisional Court and then
the House of Lords282 before finally going back to the Magistrate's Court
at Bow Street where Pinochet was committed to await the decision of the
Secretary of State. 283 The final decision on whether to extradite always
276 See id., citing Working Group on the Draft Convention, U.N. Doc. E/CN, 4/1984/72,
para. 26.
277 See Bartle, 38 I.L.M. at *627.
278 See id. at *649.
279 Id.
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282See Bartle, 38 I.L.M. 581.
283 Bartle, supra note 6, at *6.
belongs to the Secretary of State,284 in this case Jack Straw. Above and
beyond this general overview, Part III of the Extradition Act of 1989 has
other requirements that must be met by Spain, the requesting state.
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Before the Extradition Act of 1989 came into effect in England, the
Extradition Acts of 1870 and 1967 governed extradition in the United
Kingdom,286 and an important principle in those Acts survived to make a
large impact on the Pinochet case. This is the principle of double
criminality which means that for a crime to qualify as an extradition
crime, it must be a crime in both the state requesting extradition and the
state where the offender is being held.287 According to the first schedule of
the Act of 1870, criminal acts "had to be construed according to the law
existing in England ... at the date of the alleged crime."2 88 This means
that the alleged crimes of General Pinochet must have been considered
crimes in England as well as in Spain at the time they were committed.
Lord Browne-Wilkinson reasons that because there was no mention of the
date at which to consider an act criminal under the Extradition Act of
1989, the date when the act was committed should stand as the norm,
rather than the date at which the extradition request was made.289 The
importance of this distinction becomes clear when the dates of Pinochet's
alleged crimes are examined. The charges against General Pinochet cover
the years from 1972 through 1990, but his acts only became criminal in
England as of September 29, 1988, when Section 134 of the Criminal
Justice Act (applying the Torture Convention to British law) went into
effect.290 Therefore, the only crimes which may be considered in
evaluating Spain's request for extradition are those committed after
September 29, 1988.291
Part III of the Extradition Act of 1989 sets forth the requirements for
extradition when extradition is requested by another state, like Spain,
which is a party to the European Convention on Extradition.292 These six
steps are set out by Lord Templeman in In re Evans.293 First, a court in the
requesting State must consider the crime serious enough to justify the
issuance of a warrant for arrest. Second, the requesting State must
consider whether the crime, the laws of both countries, and the
circumstances justify a request for extradition under the terms of the
284 See Forde, supra note 111, at 43.
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287 See id. at 94.
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292 See id. at *587.
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Convention. Third, the requesting State must identify the offender,
authenticate the arrest warrant, give the details of the crime and translate
the foreign law that establishes an offense which is punishable by at least
twelve months of imprisonment. Fourth, the British Secretary of State
must make sure that the request is in order, that the offense named also
constitutes a crime in the United Kingdom, and must give his permission
to proceed. Fifth, there must be a committal hearing in Magistrate Court
and the magistrate must be convinced that the charge against the offender
is a serious crime in both the requesting State and the United Kingdom.
Sixth, and finally, if the offender is committed by the Magistrate, the
Secretary of State may enforce extradition. 2 94 In the case of General
Pinochet, the committal hearing took place and Magistrate Bartle
committed Pinochet to await the decision of Home Secretary Jack
Straw.
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VII. THE OUTCOME
After seventeen months under house arrest in London, General
Pinochet returned home to Chile in March of 2000.296 He suffered three
strokes while he was being held in London, and, in accordance with
medical tests run in England, Pinochet's doctors have found that he has
suffered irreversible brain damage. 297 On January 11, 2000, after review
of the medical report in England, British Home Secretary Jack Straw
announced that "the unequivocal and unanimous conclusion of the four
medical experts was that [Pinochet] is at present unfit to stand trial" and
should not be extradited to Spain.298 Although, Pinochet has been returned
to his home country and may still be immune from prosecution there,
according to the Chilean Constitution,2 99 this case can be regarded as a
victory for international human rights.
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The outcome of this case will certainly have a resounding effect not
only on political relations between England, Spain and Chile, but on
countries around the world. The Chilean government that put pressure on
Spain to drop the charges and let them handle Pinochet's offenses
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themselves 30 1 is now backing down and simply trying to find a way to let
Pinochet bow out of politics gracefully. 30 2 As of March 28, 2000, General
Pinochet faced charges in eighty different civil complaints in Chile, and
Chilean Judge Juan Guzman is currently trying to strip Pinochet of his
senatorial immunity via an appellate court in Santiago. 30 3 It is now up to
the Chilean government to determine whether General Pinochet will be
held "responsible for thousands of cases of torture, murder and
'disappearance' that took place during his time in power.
'
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